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August 16, 
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE/ 14879 
BERLIN AND GERMANY 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
have read partial texts and news ac-
counts of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's 
recent addresses. These reports are 
sufficient to make clear that Mr. Khru-
shchev has a view of the attitudes of 
this Nation regarding peace, Berlin, and 
Germany which is not accurate. Fur-
ther, they indicate that his views on 
these questions require elaboration if we 
are to appreciate the peaceful intent 
which is professed in them. The recent 
intensification of the danger of a blow-
up in the divided city, with incalculable 
consequences, emphasize the need for a 
prompt clarification. 
Mr. Khrushchev is wrong, if he mis-
takes the voice of any fraction of the 
people of this Nation for the voice of 
the Nation on the issues of peace and 
war. The right of peaceful dissent is 
an inherent part of a system of free-
dom. But in the last analysis, the 
voices to which Mr. Khrushchev needs 
to pay attention in this Nation are those 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State. For regardless of dissent, belli-
cosity, or whatever in other quarters, it 
is the President who will determine the 
critical courses of action of the entire 
Nation. And under the President, only 
the Secretary of State is equipped to 
interpret his decisions in policy. 
The President and the Secretary of 
State speak not for war, but for peace--
not merely at Berlin and Germany, but 
everywhere on the globe. And they 
speak, too, for the defense of our rights 
which our national self-respect, no less 
than the grandeur of Russia of which 
Mr. Khrushchev spoke, requires us to 
preserve against threats or the hostile 
acts of others. 
If Mr. Khrushchev means no harm to 
those rights at Berlin-and he insists 
in his statements that he does not--then 
there can be peace at Berlin. Beyond 
the defense of those rights against uni-
lateral change by others, as I have said 
many times, I am not wedded to any 
particular situation at Berlin. I am 
personally persuaded that other situa-
tions can be developed, situations far 
better than that which has now existed 
for so many years despite the enormous 
changes in Germany and Europe and the 
world since World War II. 
Indeed, Mr. Khrushchev has taken the 
initiative in this matter. He has-insisted 
that the situation in Berlin must be 
changed. He has also insisted that the 
changes will not infringe upon our rights 
in that city, including the rights of ac-
cess to West Berlin. Unfortunately, un-
til now at least, he has indicated the 
changes which he desires, but he has not 
set forth in specifics how Western rights 
would be protected. What we really 
need, if there is to be peace as well as 
change at Berlin, is an elaboration on 
what the changes which Khrushchev 
proposes may mean. For example: 
First. Mr. Khrushchev has contended 
that the East Germans can succeed to 
Soviet occupation rights in East Berlin 
by unilateral action. Does he recognize 
equally, then, that West Germans can 
succed to Western rights of occupation 
in and access to West Berlin by uni-
lateral action of the Western Powers? 
Second. Since all of Berlin has been 
a common occupational responsibility of 
the Allied Powers; that is, the Soviet 
Union, France, Britain, and the United 
States, does it not follow that any peace-
ful change in the status of a part of Ber-
lin to that of a free and neutralized city, 
must be coupled with a change of the sta-
tus of all of Berlin, Soviet, and Western 
occupied enclaves, to that of a free city? 
I think that Mr. Khrushchev will recog-
nize that unless he is prepared to extend 
his proposal of a free ·city to the entire 
city of Berlin-which he has never sug-
gested-what he proposes is a unilateral 
change which is at least a political and 
ideological act of aggression even if it 
does not involve an act of military ag-
gression. 
Third. Mr. Khrushchev insists that 
the routes of access to Berlin will remain 
open after he signs a peace treaty with 
East Germany. He says that there will 
be any guarantees necessary to achieve 
this end. But what kind of guarantees? 
Will East Germany have control of the 
routes of access after a peace treaty is 
signed? Will Russian forces remain in 
control of them? Will they be trans-
ferred to the Western Powers whose 
forces remain in West Berlin, which 
would be most logical inasmuch as the 
Soviet Union is the nation which desires 
to withdraw from its occupational re-
sponsibility? Or, If control is trans-
ferred to the East Germans, will the So-
viet Union recognize and support the 
right of the Western nations to use what-
ever means may be necessary to guar-
antee access to Berlin If it should subse-
quently be impeded? 
These, Mr. President, are some of the 
questions which must be faced and an-
swered now, if there is to be a change at 
Berlin, a change in peace. These are 
some of the questions which must be an-
swered to give substance to the assertions 
of peaceful intent which emanate from 
Moscow. 
Mr. Khrushchev has said that we 
should sit down at a table and negotiate. 
I should like to think that these are the 
type of questions, Mr. President, at least 
as regards Berlin, which would form the 
substance of negotiations. I see little 
virtue at this time in trying to deal with 
these questions in a full-dress conference 
with all the theatrical trappings of an 
international melodrama. But I see 
much virtue in quiet, sober, preliminary 
discussions of these questions. I would 
suggest that we have an outstanding Am-
bassador in Moscow, and the Russian 
Ambassador in this city is most capable. 
The task might well begin with an ex-
ploration of the questions by these men 
and the diplomats of other nations in-
volved. Or, if this means of communi-
cation is inadequate, others can be de-
vised. It is not so important, Mr. Pres-
ident, who may initiate negotiations or in 
what circumstances they may be initi-
ated; I should think the people of the 
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